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1 Average Equity Premium Puzzle










where u(ct) is the period utility function of a household deﬁned over consump-
tion ct at time t, δ is the household’s discount factor, and re
t,t+s and rd
t,t+s are
realized returns on an equity portfolio and on debt, respectively, between t and
t + s. They use a short holding period for debt and proxy its return with the
90-day U.S. Treasury bill yield. For the equity portfolio, they use the S&P 500
stocks. The average diﬀerence in the annual returns over the period 1889-1978
turns out to be 6.2%. They show this mean excess return to be too large to
be justiﬁed with the standard growth model and call it the ‘equity premium
puzzle’.
This ﬁnding by Mehra and Prescott (1985) has generated a large body of
research aiming to explore various aspects of the puzzle both in domestic and
also in international asset markets. As a result, there are now three related
puzzles: the ‘average equity premium puzzle’, the ‘low risk-free rate puzzle’,
and the ‘excess return volatility puzzle’. To explain the puzzle, economists
have taken several directions, among them, diﬀerent preference orderings and
diﬀe r e n tm a r k e ts t r u c t u r e s . 1
Recently, McGrattan and Prescott (2003) argue that some of the choices
made by Mehra and Prescott (1985) need to be revised. In particular, they
suggest that i) the T-Bill rate not be used as the ‘risk-free’ rate since most
1See Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Epstein and Zin (1989), Constantinides
and Duﬃe (1996), among others.
1households hold long-term debt in their portfolios instead of short-term gov-
ernment paper, ii) the costs of holding diversiﬁed equity portfolios have to be
accounted for, iii) taxes on dividends should be deducted from equity portfo-
lio returns, and, iv) the equilibrium condition (1) did not hold during WWII
and the Korean War as the government imposed restrictions on production,
consumer credit, and the ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Using the long-term high-grade bonds (and municipal bonds) as the ‘risk-
free’ instrument, and making adjustments ii) and iii) to equity returns (and
abstracting from the regulation-laced sub-period 1935-1960) makes the average
excess real return less than one percent. In other words, the ‘average equity
premium puzzle’ is no longer a puzzle.
This note uses the measurements proposed by McGrattan and Prescott
(2003) and examines various aspects of the equity premium puzzle in detail, in-
cluding the related low risk-free rate and excess volatility puzzles. First, Hansen
and Singleton (1982) GMM tests are performed to test the overidentifying re-
strictions of the above Euler equation using standard and proposed data sets.
Second, following Kocherlakota (1996), pricing errors based on the Euler equa-
tions for the two assets are studied. Finally, Shiller (1982) and Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991) stochastic volatility bounds are calculated and compared
with a consumption-based asset pricing model with power utility.
I ﬁnd support for two of McGrattan and Prescott (2003) statements. Their
adjustments solve the ‘mean’ equity premium puzzle and come close to solving
the ‘low risk-free rate puzzle’. However, the excess volatility of equity returns
and low correlation of returns with aggregate consumption growth leave other,
and possibly more interesting, features of the ‘equity premium’ puzzle in tact.
2 Alternative Measurements
The standard measurements used in the study of the equity premium puzzle
consist of the real returns on the S&P 500 index and the 90-day Treasury Bills.
The proposed measurements are an adjusted S&P 500 return series and a long-
term debt series. The former takes the standard (real) S&P 500 series and
subtracts from it the taxes on dividends and a measure of diversiﬁcation costs.2
The latter is high-grade municipal bond yields from 1890 to 1934, and high-
grade Moody’s Aaa Corporate bond yields from 1935 to 2002.
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of these series over the
full sample of 1890-2002.
2The equity portfolio is a collection of NYSE stocks from 1889 to 1925, the S&P 90 index
from 1926 to 1956, and the S&P 500 index from 1957 to 2002. CPI inﬂation is subtracted
from nominal returns to obtain real returns. See McGrattan and Prescott (2003) for more
details and sources.
2Table 1: Means and Standard Errors of Measurements
S&P 500 Adj. S&P 500 T-Bill Rate Long-term Debt Rate
mean 8.30% 5.08% 1.32% 2.90%
std 20.44% 20.37% 5.10% 3.25%
Note that the adjusted equity premium, the diﬀerence between adjusted S&P
500 return and the long-term debt return, is 2.18% (compared with the standard
6.98% over the period 1890 and 2002). However, this is still higher than the ‘less
than one percentage point’ argued by McGrattan and Prescott (2003). There
are two reasons for this variation. First, McGrattan and Prescott (2003) men-
tion other items not accounted for in the computation of the after-tax return
on an equity portfolio, such as capital income taxes, unmeasured diversiﬁcation
costs (brokerage fees), and possibly higher pre-1980 diversiﬁcation costs, to sug-
gest an average adjusted return ‘below’ 5%. Second, they ignore the subperiod
1935-1960 during which the government imposed constraints on households and
ﬁnancial intermediaries, holding bond yields unusually low, making the result-
ing long-term debt yield about 4%, hence an adjusted equity premium of about
0.67%.
In this note, I use both standard and adjusted measurements over the entire
sample period of 1890-2002. Furthermore, I combine standard and alternative
measurements in looking at various aspects of the equity premium puzzle to
disentangle which adjustment makes the most diﬀerence.
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where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Hansen and Singleton (1983)
tests the consumption-based asset pricing model by using the orthogonality



















The four instruments used are a constant, lagged values of consumption growth,
and lagged returns on the equity portfolio and debt. Table 2 reports GMM
estimates of the parameters and the overall test of the model.
3Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Data Used δγJ p r (χ2(6) > 0)
S&P 500 and T-Bills 1.017 2.250∗ 29.03 0.0001
(0.026) (1.244)
Adj. S&P 500 and T-Bills 1.034 2.902∗∗ 14.09 0.0287
(0.027) (1.286)
S&P 500 and L-T Debt 1.058∗∗∗ 5.406∗∗∗ 21.17 0.0017
(0.020) (1.021)
Adj. S&P 500 and L-T Debt 1.050∗∗∗ 4.527∗∗∗ 8.59 0.1978
(0.019) (0.821)
Ignore 1935-1960 1.011 3.446∗∗∗ 4.50 0.6094
(0.024) (1.185)
∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, and ∗ at 10%; 2-stage GMM.
Using the standard measurements for asset returns, the parameter estimates
are similar to those in the literature. The subjective discount factor is above
unity, and the risk aversion coeﬃcient is around 2. When the adjusted equity
returns are used instead of the S&P 500 returns, the risk aversion coeﬃcient
gets near 3 and is now statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level. The use of long-term
debt yields (instead of T-Bill yields) and S&P 500 returns produces an estimate
of δ that signiﬁcantly exceeds unity and a risk aversion coeﬃcient of about 5.
The overidentifying restrictions in all three cases are easily rejected.
Adjusted equity returns and the long-term debt yields produce similar pa-
rameter estimates. However, in this case, the overidentifying restrictions of the
Euler equations cannot be rejected. This conclusion is strengthened if I use the
adjusted stock returns and long term debt yields over a restricted sample that
leaves out the 1935-1960 period from the full sample 1890-2002 on the ground
that government regulations kept the interest rates artiﬁcially low.
In the following sections, I will explore other aspects of the equity premium
puzzle using the proposed measurements.
4 Pricing Errors























If the stochastic discount factor from standard theory, the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution in consumption, were to price these two assets
4correctly, the pricing errors should be zero on average. Table 3 presents the
ﬁndings.
Table 3: Equity Premium Puzzle: mean of {e
e−d
t+1}
S&P500/T-B Adj. S&P500/T-B S&P 500/Debt Adj. S&P500/Debt
γ et -stat et -stat et -stat et -stat
0 0.0698 3.73 0.0376 2.03 0.0540 2.88 0.0218 1.17
1 0.0682 3.67 0.0365 1.98 0.0527 2.82 0.0211 1.14
2 0.0667 3.60 0.0355 1.93 0.0516 2.77 0.0204 1.10
3 0.0653 3.52 0.0346 1.88 0.0504 2.71 0.0197 1.07
4 0.0639 3.44 0.0336 1.83 0.0494 2.66 0.0191 1.04
5 0.0626 3.36 0.0327 1.77 0.0485 2.60 0.0186 1.00
6 0.0614 3.27 0.0319 1.71 0.0476 2.53 0.0181 0.97
7 0.0602 3.18 0.0310 1.65 0.0468 2.47 0.0176 0.93
8 0.0591 3.08 0.0302 1.58 0.0460 2.40 0.0172 0.90
9 0.0580 2.98 0.0294 1.52 0.0453 2.33 0.0167 0.87
10 0.0570 2.87 0.0287 1.45 0.0447 2.26 0.0164 0.83
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 conﬁrm Kocherlakota’s ﬁndings. Using the stan-
dard measurements yields statistically positive pricing errors from equation (2)
for risk aversion coeﬃcients up to 10 (and higher). However, using adjusted re-
turns and the standard short-rate now yields pricing errors that are not diﬀerent
from zero on average for most ‘reasonable’ risk aversion coeﬃcients. When the
proposed long-term debt is used as the risk-free rate together with the standard
equity returns, pricing errors are still large and statistically signiﬁcant on aver-
age. Finally, when the long-term debt yields are combined with adjusted S&P
500 returns, then for all risk aversion coeﬃcients in the table, pricing errors
are statistically zero.3 McGrattan and Prescott’s suggestion appears to have
resolved the ‘mean’ equity premium puzzle.
How about the ‘low risk-free rate’ puzzle? Table 4 shows average pricing
errors computed from equation 3).
3Computing the t-tests using the shortened sample 1890-1934 combined with 1961-2002
produces essentially the same results.
5T a b l e4 :L o wR i s k - F r e eR a t eP u z z l e :m e a no f{ed
t+1}
T-Bill Yield L-T Debt Yield L-T Debt Yield, no war
γ et -stat et -stat et -stat
0 0.0031 0.65 0.0187 6.18 0.0276 12.75
1 −0.0134 −2.28 0.0019 0.42 0.0115 2.61
2 −0.0287 −3.53 −0.0137 −1.96 −0.0031 −0.39
3 −0.0426 −3.96 −0.0280 −2.86 −0.0163 −1.41
4 −0.0554 −4.04 −0.0410 −3.24 −0.0281 −1.84
5 −0.0669 −4.03 −0.0529 −3.38 −0.0386 −2.03
6 −0.0772 −3.92 −0.0636 −3.40 −0.0477 −2.08
7 −0.0864 −3.77 −0.0731 −3.35 −0.0555 −2.06
8 −0.0943 −3.60 0.0814 −3.25 −0.0619 −2.00
9 −0.1011 −3.40 −0.0886 −3.11 −0.0671 −1.90
10 −0.1067 −3.20 −0.0946 −2.96 −0.0709 −1.78
Using the T-Bill rate produces results that are similar to Kocherlakota’s
ﬁndings. The minor diﬀerences are due to the fact that I am using a longer
sample. How much does the use of the long-term debt yield help? The average
pricing error is statistically zero only for the log utility case, but otherwise
the ‘low’ risk-free rate puzzle survives. If the sub-period 1935-1960, when the
government restrictions were in place, is ignored, then values of γ between 2 and
4 seem to deliver zero mean pricing errors using equation (3) as a reasonable
pricing equation.
Overall, the new measurements appear to solve the ‘mean’ equity premium
puzzle, but make the risk-free rate consistent with standard theory only for a
few values of the risk aversion coeﬃcient.
McGrattan and Prescott (2003) argue that the excess volatility of the equity
returns is still a puzzle. In the next section, I replicate some of the analyses
of Campbell (2002) in combining the volatility of the equity returns (and their
correlation with consumption growth) in addressing the success of standard
theory in rationalizing the asset returns.
5 Volatility Bounds
It seems that the mean pricing error over the sample agrees with McGrattan and
Prescott’s interpretation. Would a similar conclusion go through after taking
into account the volatility of the adjusted equity premium and the correlation
of consumption growth and the adjusted excess returns? To examine the im-
plications of the equilibrium asset pricing equation described in the previous
sections, I will now follow Campbell (2002) who assumes that the stochastic
discount factor Mt+1 = δ(Ct+1/Ct)−γ is conditionally lognormal, and derives










t+1 are log (gross) real returns on equities and the risk-free
instrument, σ2
erm is the variance of the excess return on equities, σerm,∆c is the
covariance of excess returns with aggregate consumption growth.4 Implications
of this condition are studied in Table 5.
Table 5: The Equity Premium Puzzle
aere σerm σ(m) σ∆c correrm,∆c coverm,∆c RRA(1) RRA(2)
S&P500/T-B 6.77 19.48 34.73 3.21 0.0917 5.74 117.79 10.80
Adj. S&P500/T-B 3.73 18.82 18.66 3.21 0.0910 5.85 63.75 5.80
S&P500/Debt 5.18 19.65 26.37 3.21 0.0906 5.72 90.56 8.20
Adj. S&P500/Debt 2.15 20.19 10.66 3.21 0.0898 5.83 36.94 3.32
Ignore 1935-1960 0.67 19.86 3.39 3.46 0.1148 7.89 8.53 0.98
The ﬁrst two column of Table 5 give the sample averages and standard errors
of excess returns (equity premiums) using four alternative measurements. The
third column is the ratio (times 100) of the ﬁrst column to the second column,
the Sharpe ratio, or the volatility bound for the stochastic discount factor.
Columns four, ﬁve, and six report the standard error of consumption growth,
and the correlation and covariance of consumption growth with excess returns.
The last two columns are the implied relative risk aversion coeﬃcients computed
using equation (4). Column seven uses the calculated correlation coeﬃcient
whereas column eight assumes a correlation coeﬃcient of unity. According to
the ﬁrst row (using standard measurements), the equity premium puzzle exists
because of both smoothness of consumption growth and low correlation between
excess returns and consumption growth. However, using either the long-term
debt yield or adjusted returns to calculate the excess returns suggests that the
low correlation is primarily responsible for the diﬃculty of standard theory
to account for the equity premium. With the proposed measurements, a risk
aversion coeﬃcient of about 3 would suﬃce to satisfy the ‘new’ equity premium,
if the consumption growth and excess returns were perfectly correlated. Given
the empirically low correlation, however, even the new measurements fail to
revive standard theory. Hence, this particular implication of the equity premium
puzzle survives.
The last row uses the adjusted measurements and ignores the period 1935-
1960 which McGrattan and Prescott (2003) argue as a period with government
regulation on ﬁnancial life that has kept the interest rates artiﬁcially low. This
would give the McGrattan and Prescott (2003) the best chance at addressing the
excess volatility puzzle. There are two outcomes that go in the right direction
to help explain the excess volatility puzzle. First, the mean excess return de-
creases to 0.67, and second, the correlation of excess returns with consumption
growth increases to 0.1148. As a result, a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 8.53 is now
consistent with the asset pricing implication given in equation (4). However, it
is not clear if this value is a plausible coeﬃcient from the standpoint of standard
4See Campbell (2002) for details. Tables 5 and 6 replicate the analyses in his Tables 4 and
5.
7theory. Assuming perfect correlation between consumption growth and excess
return delivers a more plausible coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, 0.98, as the
last column indicates.
To study the low risk-free rate puzzle, Campbell (2002) uses
Erd





where g is the mean growth rate of consumption.
Table 6: The Riskfree Rate Puzzle
rf ∆cσ (∆c) RRA(1) TPR(1) RRA(2) TPR(2)
S&P500/T-B 1.20 1.79 3.21 117.79 15,770.99 10.80 −11.46
Adj. S&P500/T-B 1.20 1.79 3.21 63.75 163.24 5.80 −7.21
S&P500/Debt 2.85 1.79 3.21 90.56 1302.13 8.20 −8.09
Adj. S&P500/Debt 2.85 1.79 3.21 36.94 7.28 3.32 −2.54
Ignore 1935-1960 3.77 1.71 3.46 8.53 −6.29 0.98 2.11
The ﬁrst three columns in Table 6 show the average risk-free rate, mean
consumption growth rate, and the standard deviation of consumption growth.
Using these and the implied risk aversion coeﬃcients from Table 5 in equation (5)
produces the implied time preference rates in the two columns labeled TPR(1)
and TPR(2). Risk aversion coeﬃcients in RRA(1) yield positive but implausible
time preference rates, except for the proposed measurements with a 7.28% rate.
Risk aversion coeﬃcients in the RRA(2) column all produce negative rates of
time preferences. The last row yields a slightly negative rate of time preference,
−2.54%.
When I ignore the regulation period 1935-1960, the time discount rates con-
sistent with the asset pricing condition (5) become −6.29% and 2.11%, respec-
tively. It appears that the adjusted measurements do provide a solution to the
risk-free rate puzzle, to the extent that these time preference are considered
plausible.
86 Hansen and Jagannathan Volatility Bounds
Lastly, I will describe the Hansen-Jagannathan volatility bounds computed from
the adjusted measurements. Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of (gross) annual
asset returns, both standard (T-Bills and S&P 500) and adjusted (long-term
debt and adjusted S&P 500) over the sample 1890-2002. Note how the overall
central tendency has shifted to the right and slightly down.
Figure 2 plots the (gross) rate of growth of consumption of nondurables and
services.
9These data are used to generate the Hansen-Jagannathan volatility bounds
in Figure 3 below. Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), the straight line
bounds are produced using the restriction on excess returns
[var(x0b)]0.5 ≤ σ(m),
where
b =[ cov(x,x)]−1[q − E(m)E(x)],
x is the excess return, q = E(mx) and m is a stochastic discount factor whose
mean can be approximated by 1/E(rd
t). The parabolas are computed using
q = 1,
b =[ cov(x,x)]−1[1 − E(m)E(x)]
p
b0cov(x,x)b ≤ σ(m),
where x is a 2 by 1 vector of returns on equity and debt.
10With standard measurements, it takes an implausibly high risk aversion
coeﬃcient like 25 for standard theory to satisfy the volatility bounds. After the
McGrattan and Prescott adjustments, a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 5 is suﬃcient
to get within the bounds.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
McGrattan and Prescott (2003) argue that using an adjusted set of measure-
ments eliminates the average equity premium puzzle. Most of the implications
of standard theory considered here agree. The low risk-free rate puzzle, and the
excess volatility puzzle remain. Standard theory cannot account for the excess
volatility of equity returns relative to that of consumption growth and the low
correlation of excess returns with aggregate consumption growth.
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